Philosophers generally agree that joint actions are actions done with shared intentions: what distinguishes joint from individual actions is that the joint ones involve a shared intention, and shared intentions are essential for understanding coordination in joint action. This conceals deep disagreement on what shared intentions are. Some hold that shared intentions differ from individual intentions with respect to the attitude involved (Kutz, 2000; Searle, 1990 [2002]). Others have explored the notion that shared intentions differ with respect to their subjects, which are plural (Gilbert, 1992), or that they differ from individual intentions in the way they arise, namely through team reasoning (Gold & Sugden, 2007), or that shared intentions involve distinctive obligations or commitments to others (Gilbert, 1992; Roth, 2004). Opposing all such views, Michael Bratman (1992, 2009) argues that shared intentions can be realised by multiple ordinary individual intentions and other attitudes whose contents interlock in a distinctive way. Perhaps some of the disagreement among philosophers arises from the fact that joint action is a heterogeneous notion.

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Roth, A. S. (2004). Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments. *The Philosophical Review, 113*(3), 359-410.

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[longer version]

Among philosophers there is general agreement that joint actions are actions done with shared intentions: what distinguishes joint from individual actions is that the joint ones involve a shared intention, and shared intentions are essential for understanding how joint actions are coordinated. There is much debate on what shared intentions are. John Searle {\, 1990 [2002] #1369} and Christopher Kutz {\, 2000 #1290} hold that shared intentions are intentions of a special kind—they differ from individual intentions with respect to the attitude involved; Michael Bratman {\, 1992 #1197; \, 2009 #1768} argues that shared intention is not a special kind of attitude but rather involves intentions whose contents interlock in a special way; Margaret Gilbert held that individual differ from shared intentions because the subject of a shared intention is a plural subject; relatedly, she and others have held that the characteristic feature of shared intention is that it involves obligations or commitments to others {Roth, 2004 #1427}{\Gilbert, 1992 #1426}; and, opposing all of these views, Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden have argued that shared intentions are distinctive not in their nature or contents but in being produced by a certain kind of reasoning, team reasoning {Gold, 2007 #1383}.